The Dynamics of Employee Relations Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2250 words

The Dynamics of Employee Relations - Essay Example Historical Perspective In Britain’s history, three industrial relations systems have dominated during three distinct time periods. The collective laissez-faire system gave rise to trade unionism and industry bargaining, which lasted from about 1890 to 1960; crisis, reconstruction, and technological advances that led to mass layoffs and wage restraints between 1960 and 1980; and the single European market, deregulation, and erosion of economic autonomy, that led to the individualisation of industrial relations after the 1980s and until the present (Howell, 2000). The period 1890 to 1945 saw the most important developments in the role played by collective bargaining and trade unionism. Even prior to the 20th century, there were significant pieces of legislation passed that impacted on the legal obligations between employers and employees, such as the Employers Liability Act of 1880. By the 1900s a â€Å"new unionism† emerged that was characterized by more active union act ivity (particularly the use of strikes and â€Å"picketing†) and an increase in the number of members, accompanied by an increase in the employers’ recourse to the courts to file cases against trade unions. Generally, however, court rulings tended towards relaxation of the law in favour of the labour unions (Brodie, 2003). The entry of Britain into World Wars I and II created exigencies that impacted on government’s labour relations policy. Because of the importance of continued productivity to ensure an unhampered supply of the basic necessities, as well as the implements of war, the government took the stance that restrictive practices that tended to cause friction between employers and employees should be reduced, and cooperation ensured between them. This necessitated heavy government intervention. This was seen by labour as a relinquishment of some of their hard-won concessions. Initially this was left to voluntary means, but when this strategy failed, the state resorted to legislation that controlled profits, froze wages, banned strikes and lock-outs, and suspended restrictive practices. (Brodie, 2003). The post-war period, until the 1960s and 1970s, saw a bid to return Britain to its pre-war socio-economic normalcy. The policy pursued was consistent with the control exerted by the government during World War II, which was seen as highly successful and instrumental in tiding the country through the war. The Keynesian economic theory of state planning and intervention put into effect was accompanied with enhanced power for labour, which was warily greeted by industry. Some capitalists saw some wisdom in the strategy of the Labour government for economic regeneration through increased intervention, but stressed that this intervention must be tempered by â€Å"insulation from working class demands† (Price, 1990, p. 214). For the most part, however, capitalists held little sway over government policy at this time, with trade union ism being accorded

Companies entering into contract Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Companies entering into contract - Case Study Example Right before signing the contract, there was no proper consultation by the client for proper requirements of the project; this was the first cause of the failure. Also contributing to the failure were the poor mechanisms to track the progress of the project by both parties. Furthermore, there was no clause to cater for arising issues and amendment of the contract. This resulted in lack of proper measures to solve many issues that were arising, leading to eventual failure of the project. Before signing contracts, there should be thorough consultations between concerned parties to avoid making errors that may result in losses to the companies involved. All employees should know the laws guiding professional ethical and ensure that they honor them for their own benefit, as well as that of the company as a whole. Keywords: Contract, Guilt, Agreement, Sign, Project, Measures, Consultation, Client, Developer Legal Directions that the Involved Parties should have Adopted The failures that h ave been associated with this contract provide enough evidence that the agreement between the software developer and the client company was incomplete. The various evidences of inappropriate conduct by either party symbolize the lapse in honoring the contract. There were also a lot of gaps left during the initial formulation of the contract, which encouraged the misconduct. It is important to define users’ requirements during the signing of contract. Right from the onset, the client should have involved the IT department in the process of issuing out the contract, since the product that was to be developed falls under their area of specialization; therefore they understand the requirements better. For example, the IT department could have challenged the vendors on various issues relating to the software that was to be developed, and were best suited to probe the developers on all matters relating to the operation of the software. Another failure caused by the client is the fa ilure to involve operational performance in the contract; this should have been the main aim of the software. This is because the contract was too open. Each party failed to know the real role of the software. In particular, any payment should be based on the performance of the item, and the various stages of payment should go hand in hand with functionality of the project. To handle this well, the contract should involve a clause to demand the vendor to provide the software design, so it could act as a guideline during each phase of the software development. Action taken towards the Two External Contractors Following the unlawful conduct of the employees whose employment was contract based, the company should have taken stern disciplinary action, because their conduct led to loss of confidence on the company by the client. This happened soon after the two contracted employees met with the client. Though it may not be clear what they discussed, actions speak louder than words. The c lient company pulled out of the contract and as a result, Dag Brucken (DB) incurred a lot of losses, including the loss of time and finances invested in the project. The greatest offence that these two employees are held liable for is revealing a company’s secret, whose result was loses to the company. Legal action that could be taken against them includes being taken to a court of law, so that they would face prosecution in reference to employee’s code of conduct and mode of conduct; their conduct was in contrast to the company’s policies. Ethical actions comprise the termination of their employment, and subsequent charges made upon them to repay the losses incurred by the company, due to their gross misconduct. DB Company

Malunggay as an effective cooking oil Essay Example for Free

Malunggay as an effective cooking oil Essay Commercial cooking oil is an enormous need of people nowadays. These days, cooking oil is becoming expensive. Commoners, or people with insufficient finance, can no longer afford this necessity. Instead, they opt for oil with lesser quality simply because it’s cheaper. It’s very ghastly to do this because for one; your health could be affected, two; you could harbour diseases, and three; on the worst case scenario, it could lead to your death. To think that they would go to extreme lengths, such as that, just to provide oil. Going back to the topic prior to this, we think that although it may be costly, most cooking oils are of unsatisfactory standards especially in our nutrition. With that said, we all share the idea of wanting to solve this problem. We conducted a research about the effectivity of Moringa Olefeira, also known as â€Å"Malunggay†, when used as an ingredient for cooking oil. We chose Moringa Olefeira for a reason; gram for gram, â€Å"Malunggay† leaves contain: seven times the vitamin C in oranges, four times the Calcium in milk, four times the vitamin A in carrots, two times and the protein in milk and three times the Potassium in bananas. Using this so called â€Å"Wonder Vegetable† (according to the elderly), we could create a product that can be healthy and useful, and at the same time be sold in a reasonable price. Our main goal is aimed at the welfare of everyone. We hope that this experiment can be of great help to anyone who uses it. We gathered the data of this study from various references. We owe a massive and part of this study to literature and the internet; without them we wouldn’t have anything, even a problem, to begin with. 3 Statement of the Problem. Main Problem Can malunggay (Moringa Oleifera) leave extract be a potential material for formulating cheaper yet healthier commercial cooking oil? Specific Questions 1. At which concentration of malunggay (Moringa Oleifera) leaves extract will it be able to cook food? a. 10 mg/ml b. 20 mg/ml c. 25 mg/ml 2. How effective will it be on cooking safe and edible food? It can be inferred in terms of: a. Period or time of cooking b. Taste of the food cooked c. Nutrition facts or nutrients contained by the food 4. Significance of the Study People living in the community. The study will help the people in the community to manufacture useful cooking oil that can be alternatively used to cook food – which is a basic commodity. Malunggay is very common to the community so people can easily grow them and prepare it for extraction. In addition, unlike the commercial cooking oil we use, it is healthy and contains the nutrients of malunggay. The researchers. The researchers will benefit from the study because in would fulfil our curiosity. It will also encourage us to find other alternatives from malunggay -which is very abundant in our country- that can help us in our everyday lives. Environment. The environment profit from the study in the fact that cooking oil that is already used by people will just be thrown away in the streams and it will cause water pollution. Not like with the cooking oil made from malunggay, its chemical components can be easily dissolved in water. Manufacturers of commercial cooking oil. This study would help big companies as it lessen the production cost of cooking oil because it only uses malunggay. 5 Scopes and Limitations of the Study The study aims to produce budget-friendly and nutritious oil that can be used by people to cook their own food. In able to do this study, researchers must first collect Malunggay (Moringa Oleifera) around the community and prepare it for extraction in the laboratory or do it at home. After the extraction process, series of test must be done to prove and justify the effectivity of the product. It must cook food using stoves at normal cooking temperature that are normally used by households and the food must contain healthy nutrients that must be good to our body. This experiment also has its fair share of restrictions. And one of those restraints is when the researcher doesn’t have sufficient materials to create the said product, especially if they don’t have the main ingredient or, in this case, the malunggay. The person would have to plant or buy these materials, thus spending much time and cash. Speaking about money, another problem may occur if the researcher has a weak budget. An extra problem is if the researcher does not have enough knowledge to create and research about the problem. Another limitation of the study is when the researcher doesn’t have a place to create the product or when his surrounding isn’t fit for the making of the substance. The researcher must remember to take into account even the smallest detail of this project. The researcher must have great dedication in doing this study. He should love what he is doing and he need to make it as one of he’s passion. 6.

The Absolute War

The Absolute War In order to understand why absolute war does not occur in reality, the absolute war should be defined in the first place. It should be underlined that absolute war differs from total war. Total war involved the total subordination of politics to the war effort, an idea Clausewitz emphatically rejected, and the assumption that total victory or total defeat were the only options. Total war involved no suspension of the effects of time and space, on the other hand Clausewitzs concept of the absolute did.[1] The word absolute refers to purity and extremes in that sense. Before explaining Clausewitzs conception of absolute war, his military as well as intellectual and historical background should be kept in mind. The context of Clausewitzs ideas which covers the transition from the enlightenment to the German movement that was hostile to it should be recognized. In Berlin Institute for Young Officers, he learnt that the theory had to be concrete and circumstantial, encompass that formed the reality, and be closely linked to historical experience.[2] He was also influenced by the theoretical ideal that has to reflect the relationship between the parts of war and the whole, and be necessarily grounded in the nature of things. The primacy of the major battle, aided by a massive concentration of forces and aggressive conduct, and aiming at the total overthrow of the enemy reflected the impact of the Napoleonic experience.[3] In 1827, while composing On War, Clausewitzs line of thought underwent a radical change of direction. He transformed but did not ab andon his old military outlook, and developed completely new theoretical devices. The origins and nature of Clausewitzs new theoretical framework have remained a mystery, and as a result the exact nature of the transformation in his thought has not been entirely clear. This explains why Clausewitzs ideas could be interpreted so differently by successive generations.[4] Clausewitz wanted to do more than merely writing for next generations, or Prussian army, he wanted to search for the absolute, the very nature, or the regulative idea of things.[5] He put emphasis on the role of the theory that it is its duty to give the place to the absolute form of war and to use that form as a general point of direction, it had to reflect the relationship between the parts of war and the whole, and to be found in the nature of things. He regarded absolute war as ideal in the philosophical sense, as a regulative idea which gives unity and objectivity to diverse phenomena, an idea like that of perfect beauty in art which may never be attained but constantly approximated.[6] According to Clausewitz, the definition of war is: War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.[7] After defining, he then deductively argued from this definition to essential features to conclude how one should behave to realize its will. Therefore, from the definition, it can be understood that the violence, or physical force is the means, and the compulsory compliance of the adversary to our will is the ultimate end. To this end, the violence is pushed to its utmost bounds, since one side dictates law to its adversary, there occurs a kind of reciprocal action, leading to an extreme, which is first reciprocal action [8]. To compel the enemy to our will, the enemy must be placed in a situation so that he would sacrifice which is demanded. This situation can be disarming the enemy, threatening him with it, or overthrow of him. As long as the enemy is not defeated, there is always possibility that he may dictate to the other side. Therefore, it is the second reciprocal action leading to second extreme.[9] If one wants to defeat the adversary, he must proportionate his efforts to the others powers of resistance by increasing the means as much as possible, however the adversary would do the same and meet him in a new mutual enhancement, therefore there would occur the third reciprocal action leading to the third extreme.[10] The absolute war can also be understood as a war, in which all available force is concentrated into a single, instantaneous blow.[11] From this logic, it can be argued that there can be no middle ground between the state of peace and the absolute war, the two extremes where force remains wholly unused or wholly and immediately used in order to make the adversary defenceless. However, in reality, the conduct of war engages the incremental use of force.[12] The discrepancy between the absolute and real wars is due to the two basic factors. Firstly, the real war is dictated by the time and space. Actual military means are spatially distributed; therefore they can be employed in some period of time, but not instantaneously. Also, the real war is affected by the friction, which refers to the obstacles to the efficient usage of force that the real world imposes, and it is caused by the chance, and uncertainty, physical exertion and danger.[13] Moreover, for constraining the absoluteness of war, Clausewitz introduced the effect of politics on wars. According to him, all characteristics of war are influenced by politics, and this influence is not part of the nature of war. On the contrary, the influence of politics is an external force which works against the true essence of war, harnesses it to its needs, and modifies the imperatives which it imposes in the process.[14] It is due to the fact that when the political influence on the war is admitted, one may be willing to wage minimal are closely linked to the character and scope of the political objectives. These wars may consist threatening the enemy, with negotiations held in reserve.[15] Therefore, the politics convert the destructive element of war into a mere instrument, in other words, the conception that war is a mere continuation of policy by other means.[16] To introduce the Trinitarian nature of war, Clausewitz, first of all, wrote that warfare was a complex combination of passion, chance and reason. War is partly a matter of great passion, of hatred, danger, exertion. To the extent that war was an extension of politics, it was a rational, purposive activity aimed at altering the behaviour of an opponent. War, according to Clausewitz, was also the realm of chance. This combination makes war a paradoxical trinity. [17] In short, war is composed of three elements: first, primitive violence, hatred, and hostility, which should be regarded as a blind natural force; second, the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and third, its subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.[18] The relations among these elements are fluid and tense. As warfare moves towards its absolute nature, the passion increases and the rational direction of war becomes more problematic. As the violence becomes more complete, untramelled, and absolute -since the pure concept requires, war would drive policy out of office and it would rule by the laws of its own nature. As the goals of war expand and the stakes increase, warfare would tend to move towards to the absolute form. This tendency towards absolute war would increase the tensions between the constitutive elements of the trinity, threatening to displace reason.[19] However, by arguing that the war is the extension of politics, Clausewitz asserted the rational direction of war as a whole. Similarly, as long as war is a political activity, it is fought for a purpose. It is neither the result of unreasoning passion, nor the result of mistakes. Besides, to explain the fact that although politics is artificial element to the nature of war, the real war may still come close to the absolute war. From Clausewitzs writings, it can be understood that state policy determines the main lines along which war is to move. This is the correct order of things, since the policy does not demand anything against the nature of war. If the political tensions carry very powerful character, and if adequate material means are given, the political aim may disappear behind, or rather coincide with, the military aim of disarming the enemy. In such case, real war approaches to absolute war. [20] He argued that this type of warfare would appear again and again in the age of nationalism.[21] On the other hand, this does not necessarily mean Clausewitz argued in favour of the absolute war, but rather he supported limited war. His conception of war became more durable, and more sophisticated after seeing Napoleons defeats at Russia in 1812, at Leipzig i n 1813 and finally at Waterloo in June 1815. This conception became regarded as a political act, and as an act which is and should be limited.[22] To argue in favour of why limited wars happen in reality, Liddell Hart raised Clausewitzs conception of absolute war to the level of an infallible religious dogma.[23] In this critic, it may be argued that Hart did not carefully read Clausewitz, however at this point I would only like to give Harts point of view on war. Harts definition of strategy was designed to reemphasize the subordination of the conduct of war to political objective. He believed that since Napoleon, the definition of strategy had expanded to the point where it was controlled completely by the military, the situation which created the dominance of the false objective.[24] Therefore, he redefined strategy as the distribution and transmission of military means to fulfil the needs of policy making it more clearly dependent upon political decisions while leaving its execution in the hands of the military.[25] Since the objective of war is to change the enemys will, Hart concluded that the strategy should not accept s eeking decision in battle as a guiding principle, the situation in which the enemys power of resistance is likely to be greatest, but it should be attacking to the vulnerable points in the enemys armour where defeat would destroy his moral and physical capacity to resist. In other word, it is a strategy of paralysation thorough dislocation rather than annihilation thorough attrition.[26] Moreover, Hart also criticized Clausewitzs argument that locates overthrow of the enemy as the aim of the war. Hart argued that the complete overthrow of the adversarys forces and the occupation of the opponents territory may be necessary to his success, but it is not compulsory to ones achievement. The object is fulfilled if the enemy can be convinced that he cannot conquer.[27] In order to illustrate this logic, the nuclear age and the deterrence theory based on the assumption that when one state does cost-benefit analysis before engaging to any aggression, and in this case since one state owns nuclear capability, it would deter other states from creating or getting involved to aggression, can be used.[28] The nuclear weapons and limited war are incompatible with each other since an unlimited war with nuclear weapons would mean mutually suicide. Therefore, the states need to establish adequate forces to defend themselves. Hart criticized the common assumption that the world faces a choice between the extremes of total war and total peace, but he urged a more limited approach to war.[29] Therefore, it can be understood that if wars are likely to occur, the limitation of their destructiveness is in every states interest. Similarly, although it is always irrational to fight nuclear war, and it may not be irrational to risk nuclear war, not all wars are nuclear wars, even in the nuclear age.[30] Nor nuclear war is instrument of policy, neither are nuclear weapons. These nuclear weapons are to be used only to prevent wars, not to fight wars. The purpose of the development of the doctrine of limited war in the 1950s was to restore policy control over the use of violence.[31] From these arguments, it can be understood that states may sometimes choose limited war, in order not to start or create possibility of engagement to any nuclear wars, but to keep their power over the use of force. It can be therefore further argued that while engaging to wars, states keep their political aims limited, so that they can keep their weapons conventional and limited. For instance, in 1950, during the Korean War, the US General MacArthur was in favour of nuclear weapons against North Korea. However, American policy makers decided on diplomatic and political utility in nuclear weapons rather than military utility.[32] Therefore, when the US intervened in Korea, it used conventional and limited military means to defend the South Korea. Meanwhile, when the allied powers came at the border of Yalu River, China got involved to the conflict to support North Korea. These two states, namely the US and China fought with limited scope and conventional weapons, therefore this example shows that states sometimes prefer to keep their force limited due to the political influence. Apart from these, the bargaining theory which assumes the wars with bargained settlements developed by Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam approaches to Clausewitzs limited wars, or wars in reality. Since the bargaining theory is in realm of game theory, I will not speak of it in details. However, since one of the key feature of the theory is much more related to Clausewitzs limited wars, I will use it as an instance as an illustration. One of the features of the model is that as nations fight battles and capture forts from each other, both nations learn common information about the nature of warfare between them. As long as more and more information is revealed, the beliefs of nations converge. Therefore, wars are fought until either one side decisively defeats the other or until beliefs of each side unite sufficiently so that they can agree to a settlement.[33] Bibliography Gat, Azar. 1989. The Origins of Military Thought: From Enlightenment to Clausewitz. New York: Oxford University Press Earle, Edward Mead. 1973. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press Howard, Michael. 1983. Clausewitz. New York: Oxford University Press Bassford, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm, 8 July 2008 Gat, 1989, p.167 Gat, p.199 Gat, p.199 Edward Earle, p.94 Edward Earle, p.103 Clausewitz, p.101 Clausewitz, p.103 Clausewitz, p.104 Clausewitz, p.105 Stone, p.31 Stone, p.32 Stone, p.32 Gat, p.221 Howard, p.39 Clausewitz, p.119 Roxborough, p.625 Roxborough, p.625 Roxborough, p.626 Earle, p. 106 Earle, p.106 Cornish, p. 217 Larson, p.70 Larson, p.71 Larson, p.71 Larson, p.71 Larson, p.72 Kibaroglu, p.4 Larson, p.72 Moody, p.419 Moody, p.429 Dingman, p.56 Smith and Stam, p.787

Country vs. Culture Essay -- Culture

America is a land based on freedom. This freedom is for every individual no matter their race or culture. Our society has surpassed many judgments and concerns that these demographic differences had created in the past. These differences had previously led to a great amount of cultural diversity through the act of discrimination among our nation. America, as a country, has now opened opportunities for individuals to work and interact in environments which were previously unsuited. USA Today surveyed a minority group in 2005 and found that over one third of corporate culture embraces diversity (El Nasser). They have opened doors to expand numbers that are now reaching around 41percent of minorities working at all levels of companies and 37percent of minorities at senior management (El Nasser). America has allowed cultural views of religion and other lifestyle beliefs and values to be an individual’s choice. They have also given a vast amount of freedom to different ethnic and religious groups throughout the past decades. A number of individuals along with various groups have taken advantage of these freedoms in unacceptable and illegal ways and given a lesser punishments for their actions. There have been cultural cases surrounding the acts of rapes and murders, for example, where a defendant was given 5 years of probation for murder and another individual was given 120 days in prison for murder (Phillips). These sentences can be compared to the 10 or more years charged for a ‘normal’ murder case or the average 11.8 years in prison for an individual convicted of rape ("Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure"). The freedom this country is based on should not be shaken by the cultures coming in, but this country should s... ...ce in the English Courts." Modern Law Review. 66.4 (2003): 510-531. Web. 28 Mar. 2012. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/534/1/when_culture_means_gender(LSERO).pdf. Reddy, Sita. "Temporarily Insane: Pathologising Cultural Difference in American Criminal Courts." Sociology of Health and Illness. 24.5 (2002): 667-687. Web. 1 Apr. 2012. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9566.00313/pdf. United States. Justia US Law. Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure. Justia, 2010. Web. http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2010/title18/. Valladares, Rene. Culture Clash: Cultural Issues in Criminal Defense. District of Nevada: Juris Publishing Inc., 2007. 424-466. eBook. www.fd.org/pdf_lib/culture_clash.pdf. Willing, Richard. "Courts Asked To Consider Culture." USA Today 25 May 2004, n. pag. Web. 2 Apr. 2012. http://www.usatoday.com/educate/college/casestudies/Multicultural.pdf.

On Certainty :: Essays Papers

On Certainty In his essay â€Å"An Argument for Skepticism†, Peter Unger makes the case for the â€Å"universal form of the skeptical thesis†. He is arguing for the position that any type of knowledge is impossible for any person. His argument seems to be a simple one, derived from two very clear hypotheses, but that is not the case. This paper is an attempt to show that while philosophically interesting, Unger’s attack on knowledge is not nearly so damaging as he contends. I will argue that Unger mischaracterizes the nature of certainty as it is ordinarily used (something he says is important to his argument), and also that he has mischaracterized one of the sources he used to defend this definition. I will then present W.V.O. Quine’s psychologically based epistemology as presented in â€Å"Epistemology Naturalized† and â€Å"Two Dogmas of Empiricism†, and argue that this theory provides a more adequate account of the way knowledge and certainty are understood. I will also attempt to address the objections to Quine’s theory raised by Jaegwon Kim. So, how does one begin an attack on all knowledge? The answer, as it turns out, is quite simply. Unger’s argument consists of only two premises. The first of these states that â€Å"If someone knows something to be so, then it is all right for the person to be absolutely certain that it is so (238).† To this is added the second premise, that â€Å"It is never all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so (238).† Clearly, the conclusion â€Å"Nobody ever knows that anything is so†(238) follows. Unger next alters these premises slightly, adding the idea of overriding considerations. The first premise is the same except with the words â€Å"†¦providing only that no overriding consideration (or considerations) make it not all right (241).† Likewise, the second premise becomes It is not the case that it is all right for someone to be absolutely certain that something is so providing only that no overriding (consideration or) considerations make it all right. (242). I am perfectly willing to grant Unger the first premise. I think that there is no problem with allowing him this, in and of itself. Even the second premise is allowable in a certain, philosophically interesting sense, and in this sense, Unger’s argument is very strong. The philosophical ideal of absolute certainty is something that I think should be given up as a vain pursuit, and I think that Unger shows this nicely.

Why Athens Lost the Peloponessian War

â€Å"They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed as the saying is with total destruction, their fleet, their army; everything was destroyed and few out of many returned home. † (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 481) The Sicilian military campaign of Athens proved to be one of the most disastrous military campaigns in ancient times.The loss of thousands of soldiers and sailors, hundreds of vessels and vast amounts of money from the treasury reduced tremendously the Athenian ability to wage war; however, even in spite of such a loss, Athens was still able to prolong the war for nine more years until the Spartans defeated Athens in 404 B. C. The downfall of Athens came as a result of Spartan military operations, which destroyed the Athenian navy and cut off Athens from the supply of grain from Ionia. The decisive battle at Aegospotami in 405 B. C put an end to the Athenian empire and Athenian military power.There were many r easons for the demise of Athens, ranging from bad leadership and preparation for war to a lack of overall strategic concept for conducting the war against Sparta and its allies. All of these reasons contributed to the downfall of Athens in the Peloponnesian War; however, this paper will focus only on the failure of Athens to execute Pericles’s strategy. Athens lost the Peloponnesian War because of a failure to follow the strategy of Pericles, which ultimately led to reckless expeditions, ill-advised war decisions and loss of allies.Pericles was an Athenian politician and general during the time when tensions between Sparta and Athens were rapidly escalating. The two city-states were constantly feuding over interests and were unable to compromise on several issues such as the siege of Potidaea, Megarian decree, and allowing Aegina become independent. This unwillingness of both sides in turn, pushed the rival poleis into a war against each other, which marked the start of the f irst Peloponnesian War.Before the hostilities began, Pericles laid out a strategy before the council, which if Athens were to follow would lead to a favorable outcome over the Lacedaemonians. The principles of Pericles’ strategy centered on naval warfare, attrition and limited foreign engagements during the time of war. Pericles being a wise strategist and a general knew the strengths and weaknesses of Athens and their opponents Lacedaemonians. Athens could not match the Spartan superiority in the hoplite warfare; however, Athens was capable of destroying Sparta by conducting raids from the sea on Spartan territory.The Athenian maritime fleet became one of the most powerful fleets in the ancient world after the defeat of Persia. The Athenian navy consisted of hundreds of ships and thousands of sailors who over the years gained experience and became second to none in their craft. Their familiarity with the sea allowed Athens to sail anywhere and raise fortification against any enemy in their own land. Such an advantage over the seas prevented Athenian opponents from committing too many resources and soldiers against Athens because of the fear that Athens might strike while they were on an expedition.Furthermore, the domination of the seas allowed Athens to become wealthy from trading with her allies and colonies. The money made abroad combined with the tributes from allies allowed Athens to acquire means for prolonged wars. On the other hand, Sparta in the eyes of Pericles could not afford this luxury and had to fight shorter wars. â€Å"Spartans personally engaged in the cultivation of their land, had no private or public funds, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across the sea. (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 82) Pericles saw that Sparta can only gain land and money by battle, while Athens had plenty of islands where they received their resources from, which in turn did not require Athens to engage in many battles. In addition , Lacedaemonians were also limited by the type of alliance they were in, where each member had an equal vote. The group had to reach a consensus before they could act, while Athens made decisions and her allies followed. Pericles foresaw that the Peloponnesian League members in their war decisions would press for their own well-being instead of the common good.Therefore, when Athens would attack one of the allies of Sparta, Spartans would be put in a position where they had to choose to either to protect their allies and abandon the attack on Athens, or to continue the attack without support. That was the strategy of Pericles to defeat Lacedaemonians and their allies. By remaining in the city and conducting naval warfare, Athens would eventually reach a favorable outcome against the Spartans. Additionally, for as long as they abstained from new conquest during the war and kept their allies with them they had a good chance in winning the war.Following the death of Pericles in 429 B. C. the Athenian strategy for the war began to change. â€Å"Private ambitions and interests in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies, projects whose successes would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. † (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 126) Personal ambitions and interests were in many cases put before the common good.This change in the strategy was exhibited in many situations and the most prominent was the Sicilian campaign. It was not in Athens’ strategic interest to invade Sicily because the city was still struggling with enemies within their homeland. But, common good and the strategic interest of a polis were overshadowed by eloquent speeches of individuals who promised wealth and expansion of the Athenian Empire as the results of the expeditions. However, these expeditions proved to be more det rimental than beneficial to the city of Athens.The Sicilian campaign is the prime example of unnecessary expedition, which stemmed more from personal ambitions than overall interest of the city. Athens became involved in Sicily because of her alliance with Egesta, which was at war with Selinuntines. The Egestaeans called upon Athens to assist them in war not only because they signed an alliance and belonged to the same Ionian ethnic groups but also because of supposed danger that Syracusans the allies of Selinuntines posed to Athens. Egestaeans persuaded Athenians that if they would not act Syracusans would take over Sicily and than would join the Peloponnesians in attacking Athens.The envoys from Athens were dispatched to survey the situation in Sicily and when they returned Athens decided to join the Egestaeans in the war against Selinuntines and Syracusans. Few Athenians questioned the decision of the council, however, among them was Nicias the general who was leading the expedit ion to Sicily. Nicias argued that the expedition to Sicily would bring Athens more enemies and more problems. Athens needed to focus on the war with the Lacedaemonians and securing the empire they established and not to undertake new conquests. However, his arguments fell on deaf ears and Athens began to prepare for the expedition.Over five thousands hoplites and one hundred triremes were dispatched from Athens to Sicily in 415 B. C. The goal of the expedition was simple, to capture Syracuse, however, Syracuse stood its ground and the Athenian generals requested more soldiers and ships from Athens. Even with the reinforcements, Athens was unable to gain advantage over the Syracusans. The results of the expedition were disastrous and not what the Athenians had expected. Syracuse and their allies, with the help of Spartans were able to stop and later annihilate the Athenians in Sicily.The Athenian failure in Sicily reverberated across the Greek world, which led to more problems for th e Athenians. With the news of the defeat, not only did the enemies of Athens become more emboldened to take actions against Athens but also the Athenian colonies began to revolt which caused Athens both economic and political problems. Athens’ source of strength came from her allies and colonies. They did not only provide Athens with money in a form of tribunes but also supplied her with resources such as wood, silver or food.The Athenian alliance system was set up in such a way that it required everyone to contribute money, ships or men. These contributions were then put to use in the war by Athens. The contributions kept on coming in for as long as Athens could control her allies, however when Athens began to engage in battles and started losing them, the allies revolted. The allies and colonies began to revolt because Athens could no longer proceed with forces against them. Additionally, the treatment by Athens created resentment among the allies and colonies. The allies n o longer saw themselves as equals but as servants to Athens.When Lacedaemonians came through, their city’s majority changed sides because they believed that would receive freedom from by siding with Sparta. The revolutions of allies in many cases were also due to the bad treatment by Athens. After engaging in campaigns, which did not bring back the desired result, Athens pressed her allies for more tribunes and contributions. The poleis which did not want to pay more eventually revolted, than Athens was forced to put down the revolutions with force, which alienated the allies even more. The revolts and losses of allies had a profound impact on Athenian war efforts.Not only did they require Athens to diverge manpower and resources away from the war but also Athens was cut of from tribunes, which they badly needed after the failure in Sicily. â€Å"If you consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of the war, and will abstain willfully involving yourselv es in other dangers, indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the enemy’s devices. † (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 85) The leaders of Athens and majority of the Athenian populace did not take the advice of Pericles to heart.Witnessing the destruction of the countryside from inside the Long Walls, many Athenians became enraged with Pericles’s strategy. People like Cleon and Alcibiades who promulgated more offensive and daring plans in the war, became leaders. With their promises of wealth, glory and fame, they were able to persuade Athenians to engage in unneeded expeditions. However, these expeditions only drew the attention away of what was actually needed to end the war. Athens lost the Peloponnesian War because of her failure to follow Pericles’s strategy.Pericles’s strategy stressed the importance of navy and staying within one’s walls which if was adhered to by the Athenians; it would ultimately lead Athens towards a favora ble outcome. However, personal ambitions and interest preceded the common good, which resulted in failed expeditions and policies. These disastrous expeditions in the end were compounded with revolts and losses of allies, which ultimately led to the Athenian downfall. Athens was no longer able to provide manpower and resources to continue the war and ultimately was taken over by Lacedaemonia.